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Abstract 
Consumers can often allocate resources to the provision of local public goods and to the 
provision of global public goods. This paper reports a public goods experiment in which 
participants allocated tokens to a local exchange with a relatively high marginal payoff and 
a global exchange with a lower marginal payoff but a higher potential payoff. The 
experiment consisted of three treatments with varying degree of interaction amongst the 
members of the local groups. When participants were not allowed to interact they allocated 
more tokens to the global exchange. This result suggests that individuals care about the 
potential payoff of the group exchange more than about the marginal payoff of the 
exchange. When we allowed members of each local group to communicate, they kept 
almost no tokens for themselves and attempted to coordinate their contributions to the 
global exchange with members of the other local group. 
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1.  Introduction and Hypotheses  
 
Various researchers, starting with Marwell and Ames (1979, 1980, 1981) and Schneider 
and Pommerehne (1981), studied participants’ allocation decisions under voluntary 
contributions mechanism in a controlled environment. Previous authors focused their 
investigation on participants’ allocation decisions when they had to divide their resources 
between their private exchange and a single group exchange. However, consumers can 
usually allocate resources to the provision of local public goods, which only benefit their 
local group, and to the provision of global public goods, which benefit their local group 
as well as other local groups. For example, participants can contribute resources to the 
provision of local parks, which only benefits members of their locality, and to the 
provision of national parks, which benefits members of their locality and members of 
other localities. 
We use a controlled experiment to investigate whether participants contribute more 
to a local exchange with a relatively high marginal payoff or a global exchange with a 
lower marginal payoff but higher potential payoff.
1 One expects a contribution that is 
made to the provision of a global public good to have a lower marginal payoff than a 
contribution that is made to the provision of a local public good because the benefits of 
the contribution are distributed over more consumers. However, since more individuals 
can contribute to the provision of global goods, participants often receive a higher payoff 
if they all contribute their resources to the provision of a global good than if they all 
contribute their resources to the provision of a local public good.
2 
The design of our experiment is similar in some respects to previous public goods 
experiments with a single group exchange. Participants in these experiments are typically 
endowed with tokens that they must divide between their private exchange and a group 
exchange. Each token contributed to the group exchange increases the payoffs of the 
other group members but has a marginal payoff that is smaller than one. The participants’ 
dominant strategy is to allocate all their tokens to the private exchange. However, if 
participants allocate a sufficient number of tokens to the group exchange they receive a 
higher payoff than if they invest all their tokens in the private exchange.   3
Marwell and Ames (1981) find that individual contribute roughly half of their tokens 
to the group exchange under a variety of environmental conditions in a one shot public 
goods experiment. Isaac, Walker and Thomas (1984), Kim and Walker (1984) and Isaac, 
McCue and Plott (1985) find that average contribution tends to deteriorate in repeated 
public goods experiments, but remains above the Nash equilibrium prediction.   
Our experiment differs from previous public goods experiments because it has two 
group exchanges  - a local exchange and a global exchange. Participants in our 
experiment were randomly divided into two 4-person groups that we term local groups. 
During each decision period participants were asked to divide 25 tokens between their 
private exchange, their local exchange and the global exchange. Contributions made to 
the private exchange only benefited the contributor and had a marginal payoff of 1 (by 
definition). Contributions made by a participant to the local exchange only benefited 
members of the participant’s local group and had a marginal payoff of .6. Contributions 
made to the global exchange benefited all the participants in the experiment and had a 
marginal payoff of .4. The experiment consisted of 10 decision periods. 
One of our objectives is to investigate whether participants contribute more tokens to 
the local exchange or the global exchange. On one hand, we have reasons to believe that 
participants would contribute more tokens to the local exchange because it has a higher 
marginal payoff. Marwell and Ames (1979), Isaac, Walker and Thomas (1984) and Isaac 
McCue and Plott (1985) all report that participants in sessions with high marginal payoff 
contribute more that participants in sessions with low marginal payoff Kim and Walker 
(1984) and Brown-Kruse and Hummels (1993)  find that participants significantly 
increase (decrease) their contributions when the marginal payoff is increased (decreased) 
during the experiment. The higher the marginal payoff the less risky it is for participants 
to contribute to the group exchange.  
On the other hand, getting other participants to reciprocate by contributing to the 
global exchange can lead to higher total payoffs than getting them to contribute to the 
local exchange.  Isaac and Walker (1988a) show that increasing the group size from 4 to 
10 participants (while keeping the marginal payoff fixed) slightly increases the average 
contributions of the participants. Isaac, Walker and Williams (1991) find that a group of 
40 participants contribute a larger portion of their tokens t hen groups of 4 or 10   4
participants with the same marginal payoff. They argue that participants' willingness to 
contribute is inversely related to the proportion of the group necessary to form a minimal 
profitable coalition, defined as the smallest collection of participants for whom the return 
from contributing to the group exchange exceeds the return from investing in the private 
exchange. In out experiment, the minimal profitable coalition in the global exchange (3 
participants) represents a smaller portion of the global group (33.3%) than the minimal 
profitable coalition in the local exchange (2 participants or 50% of the local group).
3 
Therefore, participants may choose to allocate more tokens to the global exchange.  
The experiment further examines how increasing the degree of interaction amongst 
members of the local groups (without allowing any interaction between the local groups) 
affects the participants’ allocation decisions.
4 Participants were assigned to one of three 
treatments: No Interaction (NI), Group Identity (GI) and Continuous Communication 
(CC). We attempt to develop group identity in the GI and CC treatments by introducing 
participants in those treatments to other members of their local group and giving each 
local group a name.  
We have reasons to believe that group introduction would lead participants to 
contribute more to the local exchange. Campbell (1958) argues that grouping individuals 
into a reference group enhances cooperation amongst members of the group. Kramer and 
Brewer (1984) and Brewer and Kramer (1986) find that individual show more restraint in 
the consumption of a common good when they are identified as a part of a group. Schram 
and Sonnemans (1996) also find that group identity increases voting participation in a 
controlled environment. A strong group identity tends to suppress selfish ambitions and 
lead individuals to seek common goals. 
It is also possible that a group introduction, such as the one used in this experiment, will 
have no effect on participants’ allocation decisions. Eckel and Grossman (forthcoming) find 
that merely introducing members of the group to one another in a public goods experiment 
does not significantly increase their contributions to the group exchange. However, since 
members of each local group have to coordinate their contributions with members of 
another local group, introducing members of each local group to one another may lead them 
to trust members of their own local group more than members of the other local group.   5
Therefore, group introduction may be sufficient to cause participants to contribute more to 
the local exchange even though it had little effect in other public goods experiments. 
The experiment also investigates the effect of unstructured, non-binding 
communication amongst members of  each local group on participants’ allocation 
decisions. Participants in the CC treatment were allowed three minutes of unstructured, 
non-binding communication at the beginning of each decision period. Isaac, McCue and 
Plott (1985) and Isaac and Walker (1988b) show that allowing participants to 
communicate increases their contributions. Cason and Khan (1999) show that 
communication increases average contribution even with limited monitoring.
5 Other 
authors showed that communication has varying degree of effectiveness under different 
environmental designs.
6 
Allowing members of the local group to communicate can have several possible 
effects. Communication can promote trust and facilitate coordination amongst members 
of the local groups and thus lead them to contribute more tokens to the local exchange. 
Alternatively, participants in the CC treatment may attempt to coordinate contributions to 
the global exchange, which has higher potential payoff. Bornstein, Winter and Goren 
(1996), for instance, observe a great deal of inter-group cooperation during the early 
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2.  Experimental Design and Procedures 
    
The participants in the experiment were undergraduate students from the University of 
Hawaii at Manoa. They were solicited from economics classes and via electronic mail 
from various e-mail lists. All the students who signed up for the experiment and arrived 
on time were paid a $5 show up fee. The first eight students to arrive at the laboratory 
were given a number from 1 to 8 and then were randomly assigned to one of two local 
groups. Depending on which session the participants were assigned to they participated in 
one of three treatments: No Interaction (NI), Group Identity (GI) or Continuous 
Communication (CC). 
Participants in the NI treatment were not allowed to communicate with one another 
and did not know who the other members of their local group were. Participants in the GI 
treatment were introduced to other members of their local group but were not allowed to 
communicate with one another. Participants in the CC treatment were introduced to other 
members of their local group and were permitted to communicate with one another at the 
beginning of each decision period. We repeated each treatment four times in separate 
sessions. Each student was only allowed to participate in one session of one treatment.  
  Once the participants arrived at the laboratory they were seated facing away from 
each other. We instructed the participants not to communicate with one another either 
verbally or non-verbally (except during the communication sessions in the CC treatment) 
and threaten to reduce their payoff if they communicated. We gave each participant a 
copy of the instructions for the experiment (shown in Appendix  B) and read the 
instructions out loud before starting the experiment. By reading the instructions out loud 
we assured that the rules of the experiment were common knowledge to all the 
participants. After the instructions were read the participants were asked to complete two 
exercises in order to make certain that they knew how to calculate their payoff from each 
exchange. We gave participants payoff tables that were designed to help them calculate 
their payoff from each exchange (also shown in Appendix B).  
  The experiment began after all the participants completed the exercises. We first ran 
one trial period that did not count towards the participants' earning. Each session 
consisted of one trial period and 10 decision periods. Before the beginning of the first   7
decision period participants in the GI and CC treatments were introduced to other 
members of their local group. The local groups were seated in two separate rooms 
throughout the introduction. Each participant was asked to state his name, his favorite 
food and one of his hobbies. Other members of the local group were asked to repeat what 
the participant said. We then gave each local group a name, either Red or Blue. 
  Following the introduction participants in the GI treatment returned to their seat after 
which the first decision period began. Participants in the CC treatment were allowed to 
communicate with one another for three minutes following the introduction. Participants 
were told that they could talk about anything they want as long as they did not threaten 
one another or offer one another awards that did not result from their decisions in the 
experiment. Participants were also prohibited from asking other participants about their 
allocations in previous periods or from volunteering such information about themselves.  
The communication rules were designed to assure that the participants in the CC 
treatment had the same payoff structure and information as the participants in the GI and 
NI treatments. An assistant remained with each group to assure that the communication 
rules were followed. Participants in the CC treatment were allowed to communicate for 3 
minutes at the beginning of every decision period. After each communication session we 
secretly recorded on a form we term a communication log whether the group reached an 
agreement. If the group reached in agreement we tried to record how many tokens they 
decided to allocate to each exchange.
7 Following each communication session 
participants in the CC treatment returned to their seat where they made their allocation 
decisions in private. 
During each period participants were asked to divide 25 tokens between a private 
exchange, a local exchange and a global exchange. Each token contributed to the private 
exchange yielded one experimental Peso to the participant. Each token contributed to the 
local exchange yielded .6 experimental Pesos to the participant and to the other members 
of his local group. Each token contributed to the global exchange yielded .4 experimental 
Pesos to the participant and to other members of the global group, which included all the 
participants in the session. At the end of the experiment participants received 4 cent for 
every experimental Peso that they earned during the experiment.   8
If the participants contributed all the tokens to the private exchange, the local 
exchange or the global exchange they would each earn 25 experimental Pesos ($1), 60 
experimental Pesos ($2.40) or 80 experimental Pesos ($3.20) per period respectively. The 
socially optimal solution, which yielded the h ighest combined payoff to all the 
participants, was for the participants to contribute all their tokens to the global exchange. 
However, the dominant strategy for each participant was to allocate all his tokens to the 
private exchange. 
  Participants were given two minutes each period to decide on their allocation. They 
wrote their decisions on a slip of paper titled allocation slip. All the allocations slips were 
collected and given to an assistant who inputted the data into an Excel spreadsheet. Excel 
automatically calculated the payoff of each participant from each of the three exchanges. 
The assistant wrote the earning from each exchange, the total earning for the period and 
the cumulative earning up to that period on slips of paper titled earning slips. We then 
folded the earning slips to assure that the participants' earning remain private and handed 
the slips to the participants. Earnings were provided in experimental Pesos, but the 
participants were informed how to convert experimental Pesos into dollars. 
  Participants were required to record their earnings on a spreadsheet titled record 
sheet (provided in Appendix B). After all the participants recorded their earnings a new 
decision period would begin. At the end of the session we paid the participants their 
cumulative earning in cash. To assure that the participants were paid in private we moved 
all the participants to a separate room and then brought them back in one by one. We 
instructed participants not to discuss their earnings or the experiment’s  design with 
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3.   Analyses and Interpretation 
   
For each of the sessions we calculated the total contribution (summed across all 10 
periods) to each exchange as a percent of all the tokens. For convenience we define 
selfishness as the inclination allocate tokens to the private exchange, localism as the 
inclination to allocate tokens to the local exchange and globalism as the inclination to 
allocate tokens to the global exchange. We measure selfishness, localism and globalism 
as the portion of the tokens allocated to the private exchange, local exchange and global 
exchange respectively. Additionally we divide the data into two intervals: Time 1  – 
periods 1 through 5, and Time 2 - periods 6 through 10, in order to investigate what 
effects, if any, experience has on participants’ allocation decisions. Results 1 through 3 
compare participants’ allocation decisions across the three treatments. Result 4 states that 
participants allocate more tokens to the global exchange than the local exchange when 
they are not allowed to interact. Result 5 discusses how communication amongst 
members of each local group effects participants’ allocation decisions. The data is 
presented in Appendix A. We make the following conclusions. 
   
   
Result 1: Participants in the GI treatment exhibited more selfishness than participants in 
the NI and CC treatments. Participants in the CC treatment exhibited less selfishness 
than participants in the GI and NI treatments. Furthermore, participants in the CC 
treatment exhibited almost no selfishness at Time 2.  
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Support: When the sessions were ordered from the session with highest to the session 
with the lowest level of selfishness the four sessions with the highest level of selfishness 
were all GI sessions (refer to Figure 1). A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test (hereinafter 
Wilcoxon Test) rejects the hypotheses that participants in the GI treatment exhibited the 
same level of selfishness  as participants in the NI treatment (p = .0143) or the CC 
treatment (p = .0143). We conclude that participants in the GI treatments exhibited a 
higher level of selfishness than participants in other treatments with a .05 significance 
level. On average, participants allocated 52.41% of their tokens to the private exchange in 
the GI treatment compared to 36.25% in the NI treatment and 14.88% in the CC treatment.  
  The three sessions with the lowest degree of selfishness were CC sessions (refer to 
Figure 1). A Wilcoxon Test rejects the hypotheses that participants in the CC treatment 
exhibited the same level of selfishness as participants in the GI treatment (p = .0143) or 
NI treatment (p = .0286). We conclude that participants in the CC treatment exhibited 
less selfishness than participants in other treatments with a .05 significance level. 
Participants in the CC treatment exhibited little selfishness at Time 2. On average, 
participants in the CC treatment allocated 17.18% of their tokens to the private exchange 
in Time 1 and 12% in Time 2.  
 
Discussion: We strongly believe from observing the communication sessions that the 
fourth CC session, CC4, is not comparable with the other three sessions. Participants in 
sessions CC1, CC2 and CC3 used the communication sessions to discuss their allocation 
decisions. On the other hand, participants in session CC4 used the communication 
sessions to discuss personal matters that did not pertain to the experiment. Not counting 
session CC4, participants in the CC treatment allocated 11.13% of their tokens to the 
private exchange in Time 1 and only 3.47% of their tokens in Time 2. Furthermore, only 
5 out of 24 participants in sessions CC1, CC2 and CC3 allocated any tokens to the private 
exchange during any of the periods in Time 2. 
 Communication in the CC treatment may have helped participants coordinate their 
allocation decisions. Communication may have also increased trust and strengthened 
group identity amongst members of the local group. However, in other public goods 
experiments with communication selfishness remained significant even after several   11 
periods of communication (see Isaac, McCue and Plott 1985 for an example). In this 
experiment the majority of the participants in the CC treatment did not allocate any 
tokens to the private exchange in Time 2. 
One likely explanation for the low levels of selfishness in the CC treatment is that 
presence of two group exchanges led participants to focus on which group exchange they 
should contribute to instead of how many tokens they should keep for themselves. It is 
also likely that the existence of another local group helped raise trust and group identity 
amongst members of each local group. During the communication sessions several 
participants verbalized the idea that group members must stay unified in order not to be 
outplayed by the other local group.  
Participants in the GI treatment probably exhibited more selfishness than participants 
in the CC treatment because communication helped participants in the CC treatment 
reduce selfishness. However, it is not readily apparent why participants in the GI 
treatment exhibited more selfishness than participants in the NI treatment. One possibility 
is that the group introduction may have signaled participants to allocate tokens to the 
local  exchange when their predisposition was to allocate more tokens to the global 
exchange. Participants in the GI treatment may have chosen to allocate more tokens to 
private exchange because they were not sure which group exchange to contribute to. 
On average participants in the NI treatment contributed 40.74% to the global 
exchange and 31.25% to the local exchange in the first decision period. On the other 
hand, participants in the GI treatment allocated 27.75% of their tokens to the global 
exchange and 27.13% to the local exchange in the first decision period. We thus suspect 
that indecisiveness about which group exchange to contribute to may have lead 
participants in the GI treatment to keep more tokens for themselves in the first period. 
Selfishness in the first decision period was 24.21% higher in the GI treatment than in the 
NI treatment. The high level of selfishness in the first period may have made participants 
in the GI treatment more reluctant than participants in the NI treatment to contribute to 
either group exchange in later periods. 
   12 
Result 2: Participants in the CC treatment exhibited more localism than participants in 
the NI or the GI treatments.  There is no statistically significant difference between the 
level of localism in the GI treatment and the NI treatment.  
 
Figure 2 – Total Allocation to the Local Exchange by Session
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Support: When the sessions were ordered from the session with the highest to the 
session with the lowest level of localism, the two sessions with the highest level of 
localism were CC sessions (refer to Figure 2). On average, the level of localism was 
46.24% in the CC treatment, 24.89% in the NI treatment and 21.46% in the GI treatment. 
A Wilcoxon Test rejects the hypotheses that participants in the CC treatment exhibited 
the same level of localism as participants in the NI treatment (p = .0286) or the GI 
treatment (p = .0286). We conclude that participants in the CC treatment exhibited more 
localism than participants in the other treatments with a .05 significance level. 
The order of the GI and NI session appears completely random (refer to Figure 2). A 
Wilcoxon Test cannot reject the hypothesis that participants in the GI treatment exhibit 
the same degree of localism as participants in the NI treatment (p = .7571).
10 We also 
cannot reject the hypothesis that participants in the GI treatment contribute the same 
share of their public contribution (their total contribution to the two group exchanges) to 
the local exchange than participants in the NI treatment. Participants in the GI treatment 
allocated 44.78% of their public contribution to the local exchange, whereas participants 
in the NI treatment allocated 39.25% of their public contribution to the local exchange. A 
Wilcoxon Test shows that there is a .4429 probability that participants in the GI treatment 
allocated the same portion of their public contribution to the local exchange as 
 Session   13 
participants in the NI treatment. We therefore conclude that participants in the GI 
treatment exhibited the same level of localism as participants in the NI treatment.  
 
Discussion: We believe that participants in the CC treatment exhibited a high level of 
localism because communication helped promote group identity and trust amongst 
members of each local group. Participants in the CC treatment allocated 52.67% of their 
public contribution to the local exchange. Nonetheless, participants in the CC treatment 
still exhibited a good deal of globalism. In fact, in two of the sessions (CC3 and CC4) 
participants allocated a larger portion of their public contribution to the global exchange. 
Our conclusion that participants in the GI treatment did not exhibit more localism 
than participants in the NI treatment need not lead us to conclude that group identity does 
not increase localism. It is possible that the introduction used in the experiment failed to 
establish any group identity.
11 It is also possible that the introduction developed some 
group identity amongst members of the local group but did not leave them with a clear 
signal of how they should allocate their tokens as discussed in Result 1.  
 
 
Result 3: Participants in the GI treatment exhibited less globalism than participants in 
the CC treatment or the NI treatment.  There is no statistical difference in the level of 
globalism between the CC treatment and the NI treatment.  
 
Figure 3 - - Total Allocation to the Global Exchange by Session
12 
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Session   14 
Support: The four sessions with the lowest level of globalism are GI sessions. A 
Wilcoxon Test rejects the hypothesis that participants in the GI treatment exhibited the 
same level of globalism as participants in the NI treatment (p = .0143) or participants in 
the CC treatment (p = .0143). Participants in the NI only allocated 26.13% of their tokens 
to the global exchange. We conclude that participants in the GI treatment exhibited a 
lower level of globalism that participants in the NI or the CC treatments. A Wilcoxon Test 
can not reject the hypothesis that participants in the CC treatment and participants in the 
NI treatment exhibited the same level of globalism. Participants in the CC treatment 
allocated 38.89% of their tokens to the global exchange compared to participants in the NI 
treatment who allocated 38.86% of their tokens to the global exchange.  
 
Discussion: Results 1 through 3 reveal the key differences in participants’ allocation 
decisions across the different treatments. Participants in the GI exhibited more selfishness 
that participants in the other two treatments. Because they allocated most of their tokens 
to they private exchange they ended up exhibiting less globalism than participants in the 
NI and CC treatment. Participants in the GI treatment exhibited less localism than 
participants in the CC treatment. They exhibited roughly the same level of localism as 
participants in the NI treatment because participants in the NI treatment allocate a smaller 
portion of their public to the local exchange than participants in the GI treatment. 
  Participants in the NI treatment exhibited less selfishness than participants in the GI 
and more selfishness than participants in the CC treatment. However, because 
participants in the NI treatment allocated a larger portion of their public contribution to 
the global exchange than participants in the CC treatment they ended up exhibiting the 
same level of globalism as participants in the CC treatment.  
  Participants in the CC treatment exhibited less selfishness and more localism than 
participants in the NI treatment or the GI treatment. However, there were significant 
behavioral differences between participants in different sessions of the CC treatment. In 
two of the CC sessions participants allocated a larger portion of their public contribution 
to the local exchange and in two of the sessions participants contribute a larger portion of 
their public contribution to the global exchange.   15 
One of the main objectives of the experiment was to investigate whether participants 
allocate more tokens to the local exchange or the global exchange. To answer this 
question we focus our attention the NI treatment because it is more readily comparable 
than the other treatments to other public goods experiments. 
 
Result 4: Participants in the NI treatment allocated more tokens to the global exchange 




Figure 4 - -Allocation to the Local and Global Exchanges in the NI Treatment
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Support: In all four NI sessions globalism exceeded localism. Globalism averaged 
across the NI sessions was 38.86% and localism averaged across the NI sessions was 
24.89%. Localism fell from 30.43% in Time 1 to 19.35% in Time 2. On the other hand, 
globalism increased from 38.35% in Time 1 to 39.05% in Time 2 despite of an increase 
in selfishness (refer to Figure 4). 
Nonetheless, contributions to the local exchange remained positive and significant in 
all the NI sessions. Localism was lowest in session NI1 where it was still significant 
(17.85%). Localism did not drop below 5.5% in any period of any NI session. We 
conclude that although participants in the NI treatment allocated more tokens to the 
global exchange they still allocated a significant portion of their tokens to the local 
exchange.    16 
Discussion: There is strong evidence that the participants in the NI treatment preferred 
contributing to the global exchange even though the global exchange has a lower 
marginal payoff than the local exchange. Participants may have decided to allocate more 
tokens to the global exchange because it has a higher potential payoff. Participants may 
have also thought that there is a higher chance of finding other participants who are 
willing to reciprocate in the global group because the global group has more members 
than the local group.   
The drop in localism between Time 1 and Time 2 compared to the slight increase in 
globalism suggests that participants in the NI treatment attempted to coordinate their 
contributions to the global exchange. Participants in the NI treatment were relatively 
successful in coordinating their contributions to the global exchange. In session NI1, for 
instance, globalism peaked at 63% in period 7.  
 
 
Result 5: Participants in the CC treatment exhibited a high level of globalism when they 
discussed their allocation decisions. However, at the last period globalism in the CC 
treatment dropped and localism substantially increased 
 
Figure 5  - - Allocation to each Exchange in CC Treatment














Support: Excluding session CC4, in which participants did not discuss their allocation 
decisions, participants in the CC treatment allocated 39.2% of their tokens to the global 
exchange. On average, participants in the CC treatment (excluding CC4) allocated   17 
47.17% of their tokens to the global exchange in the first period. Globalism remained 
steady between 49.33% and 37.5% in periods 2 through 9 but then dropped to 11% in the 
last period (refer to Figure 5).  
The drop in globalism was mainly due to an increase in localism. In all the CC 
sessions except CC4 localism increased in the last period. On average localism is sessions 
CC1, CC2 and CC3 increased by 26.5% (from 58.5% to 85.0%) between period 9 and 
period 10 (refer to Figure 5). 
 
Discussion: From observing the communication sessions in sessions CC1, CC2 and CC3 
we learned that participants in these sessions generally tried to reach an agreement about 
their allocations. Analysis of individual allocations reveals that in 50.0% of all cases at 
least three members of the local group made the exact same allocation decision and in 
many of the other cases the deviations between the amounts allocated to each exchange 
were relatively small.
15 This finding suggests that member of each local group usually 
reached an agreement on how to allocate their tokens and that participants tended to 
follow these agreements.
16 
  We also observed that at least one participant in each local group in sessions CC1, 
CC2 and CC3 attempted to convince other members of the group to allocate more tokens 
to the global exchange in order to get participants in the other local group to increase 
their contributions to the global exchange. We believe that generally members of each 
local group attempted to coordinate their contributions to the global exchange with 
members of the other local group. Coordinating contributions to the global exchange was 
difficult but not impossible. For example, in session CC3 globalism reached 80.5% in 
period 4 but then substantially dropped in the following period 
Some participants in the CC treatment expressed their reluctance to contribute tokens 
to the global exchange for various reasons. We recorded the following reasons in the 
communication logs. (1) Participants did not think that members of the other local group 
were willing to cooperate. (2) Participants did not think that the members of the other 
group understood the experiment. (3) Participants did not think that members of the other 
group would contribute enough tokens to the global exchange to make it profitable for 
them to contribute tokens to the global exchange.   18 
We also observe an interesting end-game effect in all the CC sessions except CC4 in 
which participants substantially increase their contributions to the local exchange at the 
final decision period. In two cases members of the same local group allocated all their 
tokens to the local exchange in the final period. End game effects are commonly 
observed in public goods experiments with one public exchange. Participants typically 
increase their allocation to the private exchange at the last period of the experiment when 
other participants can no longer retaliate in respond to their selfishness. 
The local groups in the CC treatment acted in a similar way to individual participants 
in public goods experiments with one exchange by choosing the dominant strategy for the 
local group in the last period. Allocating all the tokens to the local exchange is the 
dominant strategy for the local group since it yields the highest combined payoff possible 
to members of the local group no matter what members of the other local group do. 
 Participants in the CC treatment may have reduced their allocation to global 
exchange in the last period because the other local group could not retaliate in response to 
the reduction. It is also possible that participants expected members of the other group to 
decrease their contributions to the global exchange in the last period. Therefore, they 
shifted resources from the global exchange to the local exchange in order to avoid a 
reduction in their payoff. 
The results of the experiment suggest that participants in the CC treatment tended to 
trust members of their local group (they abided by the agreements that they made with 
them). However, participants did not tend to trust members of the other local group with 
whom they could not communicate. As a result, participants in the CC treatment were 
able to accomplish intra-group coordination (coordination amongst members of each 
local group) but found it difficult to achieve inter-group coordination (coordination 
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4.  Conclusion and Possible Extensions 
 
Consumers sometimes can allocate resources to the provision of local public goods and to 
the provision of global public goods. This paper reports a public goods experiment in 
which participants could allocate tokens to a local exchange with a relatively high 
marginal payoff and a global exchange with a lower marginal payoff but a higher 
potential payoff. The experiment consisted of three treatments with varying degree of 
interaction amongst the members of the local groups. 
We find that when participants were not allowed to interact they allocated more 
tokens to the global exchange even though it had a lower marginal payoff than the local 
exchange. This result suggests that individuals care about the potential payoff of the 
group exchange more than about the marginal payoff of the exchange. It is also possible 
that participants allocated more tokens to the global exchange because their contributions 
to the global exchange positively affected more individuals that their contributions to the 
local exchange. Finally, participants may have considered it easier to find other 
participants who were willing to reciprocate in global group, which was larger than their 
local group. More research should be conducted to investigate the relative importance of 
these considerations.  
We find that increasing group interaction amongst members of each local group 
significantly affects participants’ allocation decisions. Surprisingly, merely introducing 
members of each local group to one another increased the selfishness that they exhibited. 
We suspect that the group introduction acted as signal for participants to increase their 
contributions to the local exchange, which confused participants whose predispositions 
was to contribute  more tokens to the global exchange. We conjecture that since 
participants in the GI treatment were not sure which group exchange to allocate their 
tokens to, they decided to allocate more tokens to the private exchange. 
We also find that when participants were allowed to communicate with members of 
their local group they exhibited very little selfishness. The existence of two exchange 
may have decreased participants’ selfishness by increasing group identity amongst 
members of each local group and by shifting the participants’ focus from intra-group 
coordination to inter-group coordination.   20 
  We observe that members of each local group tend to make their decisions 
collectively when they discuss their allocation decisions. Participants in the CC treatment 
generally attempted to increase their contributions to the global exchange in order to get 
members of the other local group to reciprocate. Communication amongst members of 
the local group reduces participants’ selfishness but also increase localism especially at 
the final decision period. 
Future research can investigate how changes in the marginal returns to the global 
exchange and the local exchange affect participants’ allocations decisions. It is also 
instructive to investigate if participants’ behavior changes when the size of the local 
group changes or when the global group consists of more local groups.
 17  
The research discussed here can also be extended by looking at a forth treatment in 
which all the participants in the global group are allowed to communicate. We suspect 
that participants in such a treatment will exhibit more globalism than the CC treatment 
discussed here. However, it is also possible that participants in such a treatment will 
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Appendix A: Summary of Statistics  
 
  Selfishness  Localism  Globalism 
Treatment/ 
Session 
All  Time 1  Time 2  All  Time 1  Time 2  All  Time 1  Time 2 
NI Average  36.25  31.23  41.28  24.89  30.43  19.35  38.86  38.35  39.38 
Std. Dev  10.62  9.13  12.56  7.27  7.16  7.88  9.79  7.6  12.01 
NI1  30.05  26.8  33.3  17.85  24.3  11.4  52.1  48.9  55.3 
NI2  44.65  35.50  53.8  23.9  31.5  16.3  31.45  33.0  29.9 
NI3  24.5  21.0  28.0  35.05  40.1  30.0  40.45  38.45  42.0 
NI4  45.8  41.6  50.0  22.75  25.8  19.7  31.45  32.6  30.3 
GI Average  52.41  46.58  58.25  21.46  23.0  19.93  26.13  30.43  21.83 
Std. Dev  7.97  9.6  6.43  5.8  7.91  3.69  5.18  6.93  3.91 
GI1  48.55  41.4  55.7  20.45  21.6  19.3  31  37.0  25.0 
GI2  46.3  38.8  53.8  23.5  25.8  21.2  30.2  35.4  25.0 
GI3  50.75  45.8  55.7  27.85  31.7  24.0  21.4  22.5  20.3 
GI4  64.05  60.3  67.8  14.05  12.9  15.2  21.9  26.8  17.0 
CC Average  14.88  18.33  11.43  46.24  40.45  52.03  38.89  41.23  36.55 
Std. Dev   15.87  16.29  16.16  20.92  25.74  20.06  11.4  17.4  6.62 
CC1  .8  1.6  0  68.15  66.6  69.7  31.05  31.8  30.3 
CC2  9.2  11.5  6.9  59.55  57.5  61.6  31.25  31.0  31.5 
CC3  11.9  20.3  3.5  32.8  12.5  53.1  55.3  67.2  43.4 
CC4  37.6  39.9  35.3  24.45  25.2  23.7  37.95  34.9  41.0 
 
NI Average, GI Average and CC Average are the averages across all the sessions in the 
NI treatment, GI treatment and CC treatment respectively. 
 
Std. Dev: shows the standard deviation in contributions across sessions in a given treatment   
All: shows allocation throughout the session (summed from period 1 to 10) 
Time 1: shows allocation at Time 1 (summed from periods 1 to 5) 
Time 2: shows allocation at Time 2 (summed from periods 6 to 10) 
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Appendix B: Instructions and Payoff Tables  
 
The parts of the instructions that are italicized only appeared in the instructions for the GI 
and the CC treatments. The parts of the instructions that are bolded only appeared in the 
instructions for the CC treatment. 
 
Instructions  
Please listen to the following instructions carefully. From this point onwards you are NOT allowed to 
communicate with any other participant. If you have any clarifying questions raise your hand and I will 
answer your questions in private. 
 
This is an experiment in decisions making. Depending on the decisions that you and other participants in 
the experiment make you can earn a considerable amount of money that will be paid to you IN CASH at 
the end of the experiment. During the experiment all units of account will be in experimental Pesos. At the 
end of the experiment you will receive 4 cents for every Peso that you earn during the experiment ($1 for 
every 25 Pesos). Your Cumulative Earning plus a lump sum amount of $5 for showing up on time will be 
paid to you IN PRIVATE.  
  There are a total of eight participants in this experiment. At the beginning of the experiment the 
participants will be divided into two groups of 4 participants. You and three other participants will be 
assigned to one group and the four remaining participants will be assigned to another group. You will then 
be escorted to a table where you will meet the other participants in your group. Each participant will 
introduce herself or himself to the rest of the group and will be asked to provide some basic information 
about themselves to others in the group. The two groups in the experiment will meet in two separate rooms. 
The experiment will last 10 periods and the composition of both groups will remain the same throughout 
the experiment. There will also be one practice period at the beginning of the experiment that will not count 
towards your earnings.  
 
After the introduction you will be asked to return to your seat and the experiment will begin. At the 
beginning of each period you will receive 25 tokens that you must allocate between three exchanges. You 
will then write on a slip of paper titled Allocation Slip (that will be provided to you) how many tokens you 
wish to allocate to Exchange A, how many tokens you wish to allocate to the Exchange B, and how many 
tokens you wish to allocate to Exchange C. Make sure that the total amount of tokens you allocate to the 
three exchanges equals 25 each period.  
  You, and only you, will receive one Peso for every token you allocate to Exchange A. Each token 
allocated to Exchange B will yield .6 Pesos to you and to the other participants in your group. The Total 
Allocation to Exchange B equals your allocation to Exchange B plus the allocation of the other participants 
in your group to Exchange B. If a participant allocates a token to Exchange B it yields no Pesos to 
participants who are not in her or his group. 
Each token allocated to Exchange C will yield .4 Pesos to you and to all the other participants in the 
experiment. The Total Allocation to Exchanges C equals your allocation to Exchange C plus the allocation 
of the other participants in experiment to Exchange C. All eight participants in the ex periment will be given 
25 tokens each period (just like you) and are given the exact same set of instructions as you. 
 
You can calculate your Total Earnings in a given period either by using the tables in the back of the 
instructions or by using Equation 1 (below). To use the tables obtain your Earnings from Exchange B from 
Table 1 and obtain your Earnings from Exchange C from Table 2 (both tables are provided in the back). 
Next, add your Earnings from Exchange A (which equal your allocation to Exchange A), your Earnings 
from Exchange B, and your Earnings from Exchange C together to get your Total Earnings for the period. 
To use Equation 1 calculate the Total Allocation to Exchange B and the Total Allocation to Exchange C by 
adding your allocation to the allocation of other participants in each Exchange then plug the numbers into 
the equation. Both methods will give you the same number for Total Earnings. You will receive a 
calculator to help you calculate your earnings. Example 1 shows how to use both methods. 
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Equation 1 
Total Earnings =  (Allocation to Exchange A) + .6·(Total Allocation to Exchange B)           
+ .4·(Total Allocation to Exchange C) 
 
Example 1: Suppose you allocate 10 tokens to Exchange A, 10 tokens to Exchange B and 5 tokens to 
Exchange C. Other participants allocate 40 tokens to Exchange B and 80 tokens to exchange C.  Using the 
tables you can find out that you will receive 10 Pesos from Exchange A, 30 Pesos from Exchange B (see 
Table 1) and 34 Pesos from Exchange C (see Table 2) making your Total Earning for that period 74 Pesos. 
You can also calculate your Total Earnings using Equation 1 (provided above). First note that the Total 
Allocation to Exchange B is 50 (the 10 tokens that you allocated plus the 40 tokens that others allocated) 
and that the Total Allocation to Exchange C is 85 (5 + 80). Plugging the numbers into the equation we get 
that Total Earnings equals10 (from Exchange A) + .6·50(from Exchange B) + .4·85 (from Exchange C) or 
74 Pesos. 
 
You will have two minutes to make your allocation decision at the beginning of each period. Once you 
wrote your decision on the Allocation Slip fold your allocation slip and raise your hand. An assistant will 
collect it from you. When all the Allocation Slips are collected the assistant will calculate your Total 
Earnings for the period, your Earnings from each of the exchanges and your Cumulative Earnings up to that 
period and will write them down on a slip titled Earnings Slip. Then the assistant will return the Earnings 
Slip to you and will give you a new Allocation Slip. You are REQUIRED to record all the information on 
the Earnings Slip unto the Record Sheet (attached to the instructions). No other participant will see how 
many tokens you allocated to each exchange nor will you learn the allocation decisions of any other 
participant.  
 
After all the participants receive their Earnings Slips back you and other participants in your group 
will meet and will be allowed to talk about anything for three minutes. You will meet your group for 
communication sessions at the end of every period. Following each communication session you will 
return to your sit and a new period will begin. Again, you will be given 25 tokens and will have 2 
minutes to decide on how to allocate them between Exchange A, Exchange B and Exchange C.  
 
To assure that you know how to calculate your Total Earnings please complete the following two exercises. 
Once you complete both exercises raise your hand and an assistant will come by to check if you did them 
correctly. You can use the calculator provided and the tables in the back to help you solve these exercises.   
 
DO NOT communicate with other participants in any verbal or non-verbal way while working on these 
exercises and throughout the experiment other than during the communication sessions. If you have a 
question raise your hand and I will answer your question in private. 
 
 
Exercise 1: Suppose you allocate 20 tokens to Exchange A, 5 tokens to the Exchange B and no tokens to 
Exchange C. If other participants allocate 55 tokens to Exchange B and 60 Tokens to Exchange C. What 
will be your Total Earnings? You may use your calculator and the tables, provided in the back, to help you 
answer this question. 
 
Exercise 2: Suppose you allocate 5 tokens to Exchange A, 5 tokens to Exchange B and 15 tokens to 
Exchange C. If other participants allocate 40 tokens to Exchange B and 125 tokens to exchange C what will 
be your Earnings from each exchange and your Total  
Earning for the period? 
 
Complete instructions including payoff table and record sheet can be obtained from my 
web site at www2.hawaii.edu/~yoav/papers.html 
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Record Sheet  
 
Use this Record Sheet to record your Earnings from Exchange A, Earnings from 
Exchange B, Earnings from Exchange C, your Total Earnings and Cumulative Earnings. 
All Earnings are given to you on the Earnings Slip in experimental Pesos.  
 
 






Total Earnings  Cumulative 
Earnings 
1           
2           
3           
4           
5           
6           
7           
8           
9           
10           
 
 
To get your Payoff from the experiment IN DOLLARS divided your Cumulative 











   25 
Tables 
 
Total Earnings = Allocation to Exchange A + Earnings from Exchange B 
(Table 1) + Earning from Exchange C (Table 2) 
 
 
Earnings from Exchange B (Table 1) 
Use your allocation and other allocations (in your group) to find your Earnings from 
Exchange B IN PESOS (the white area)  
 
Your Allocation   Others'  
Allocation (in 
your group)  0 Token  5 Tokens   10 Tokens 
 
15 Tokens  20 Tokens   25 Tokens 
0 token  0  3  6  9  12  15 
5 Tokens  3  6  9  12  15  18 
10 Tokens  6  9  12  15  18  21 
15 Tokens  9  12  15  18  21  24 
20 Tokens  12  15  18  21  24  27 
25 Tokens  15  18  21  24  27  30 
30 Tokens  18  21  24  27  30  33 
35 Tokens  21  24  27  30  33  36 
40 Tokens  24  27  30  33  36  39 
45 Tokens  27  30  33  36  39  42 
50 Tokens  30  33  36  39  42  45 
55 Tokens 
 
33  36  39  42  45  48 
60 Tokens 
 
36  39  42  45  48  51 
65 Tokens  39  42  45  48  51  54 
70 Tokens  42  45  48  51  54  57 
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Earnings from Exchange C (Table 2) 
Use your allocation and other allocations (in both groups) to find your Earnings from 
Exchange C IN PESOS (the white area) 
 
Your Allocation  Others'  
Allocation (in 
both groups)  0 Tokens  5 Tokens  10 Tokens 
 
15 Tokens  20 Tokens  25 Tokens 
0 Tokens  0  2  4  6  8  10 
10 Tokens  4  6  8  10  12  14 
20 Tokens  8  10  12  14  16  18 
30 Tokens  12  14  16  18  20  22 
40 Tokens  16  18  20  22  24  26 
50 Tokens  20  22  24  26  28  30 
60 Tokens  24  26  28  30  32  34 




36  38 
80 Tokens  32  34  36  38  40  42 
90 Tokens  36  38  40  42  44  46 
100 Tokens  40  42  44  46  48  50 
110 Tokens  44  46  48  50  52  54 
120 Tokens  48  50  52  54  56  58 
130 Tokens  52  54  56  58  60  62 
140 Tokens  56  58  60  62  64  66 
150 Tokens  60  62  64  66  68  70 
160 Tokens  64  66  68  70  72  74 
170 Tokens  68  70  72  74  76  78 
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1 Marginal payoff is defined as the return to the participant from the group exchange over the 
return to the participant from the private exchange. Potential payoff is defined as the highest 
payoff that participants can receive from the group exchange.  
2 Given the payoff structure of the experiment, the global exchange will have a higher potential 
payoff than the local exchange if and only if increasing the size of the group by some factor n will 
change the marginal payoff from the group exchange by some factor larger than 1/n. 
3 If 2 out of 4 participants in a local group contribute all their tokens to the local exchange the 
payoff from the local exchange would be 30 experimental Pesos (discussed in Section 2), which 
is higher than what participants would make if they kept all the tokens for themselves (25 
experimental Pesos). If 3 out of 8 participants contribute to the global exchange the payoff from 
the global exchange would also be 30 experimental Pesos, which is higher that what they would 
receive if they kept all the tokens for themselves. 
4 Due to the high transaction cost of interacting with a large group, consumers often only interact 
with members of their local group. 
5 Cason and Khan (1999) designed an experiment in which participants engage in face-to-face 
communication but the contribution levels are only revealed once every six periods 
6 See Ledyard (1995, pp.156- 158) for a summary of other public good experiments with 
communication. 
7 In many cases it was not clear what the group decision was. Sometimes the group decided to 
allocate “a lot” of their tokens to a certain exchange but did not specify how many. Other times 
the group could not decide between the different allocations schemes that its members proposed. 
8 NI1 through NI4 refer to session 1 through session 4 of the NI treatment. GI1 through GI4 refer 
to session 1 through 4 of the GI treatment. CC1 through CC4 refer to sessions 1 through 4 of the 
CC treatment. 
9 See endnote 9 for interpretation of symbols 
10 The alternative hypothesis is that participants in the GI treatment exhibited more localism than 
participants in the NI treatment 
11 Eckel and Grossman (forthcoming) conclude that a group introduction alone does not 
significantly affect participants’ behavior in a public goods experiment. 
12 See endnote 8 for interpretation of symbols 
13 Averages across sessions NI1, NI2, NI3 and NI4.  
14 Averaged across sessions CC1, CC2 & CC3. Session CC4 is excluded because, unlike the other 
CC sessions, participants in session CC4 did not discuss their allocations decisions during the 
communication sessions. 
15 We counted the number of times at least three members of each local group made the exact 
same allocation decision and divided it by the total number of periods in sessions CC1, CC2 and 
CC3 (30) times 2 (since there are two local groups per session). We did not look at session CC4 
because participants in that session did not discuss their allocation decisions. 
16 In two of the local groups one of the participants decided to allocate all his tokens to the global 
exchange no matter what the group decided on, which is why we counted the number of cases in 
which at least 3 members of the group made the same allocation decision (instead of all four) 
17 Because the global group consists of only two local groups, members of each local group 
receive a higher return from investing their tokens in the global exchange than they do by 
investing in the private exchange even if members of the other group do not allocate any tokens 
to the global exchange. Nonetheless, allocating tokens to the local exchange yields higher payoffs 
than allocating tokens to the global exchange no matter how members of the other local group 
allocate their tokens. Our global group consists of only two local groups because of budgetary 
constraints.  